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PRIVATIZATION AND PUNISHMENT IN THE NEW AGE OF 
REPROGENETICS 
Dorothy E. Roberts* 
INTRODUCTION 
My scholarship on reproduction has made me acutely aware of the 
stratification of childbearing in the United States.1  In particular, the social 
value placed on a woman’s reproduction depends on her standing within the 
hierarchies of race, class, and other inequitable divisions.  My research 
highlights the harsh dichotomy where policies punish poor black women for 
bearing children but advanced technologies assist mainly affluent white 
women not only to have genetically-related children, but to have children with 
preferred genetic qualities.2  In this regard, I have worked with organizations 
opposing a program offering substance-abusing women in minority 
neighborhoods money to be sterilized3 and attended many fancy conferences 
where academics debate precisely which traits are acceptable to select for 
when testing an array of embryos for implantation.4  While welfare reform 
 
 * Kirkland & Ellis Professor, Northwestern University School of Law; faculty fellow, Institute for 
Policy Research.  I presented earlier versions of this article at the Emory Law Journal Thrower Symposium 
and at the Radcliffe Center for Advanced Studies, University of Wisconsin, University of Maryland School of 
Law, and UCLA Law School, and am grateful to participants for their comments.  I also thank Haile Arrindell 
and Monica Hunt for excellent research assistance and the Kirkland & Ellis Fund for research support. 
 1 See RAYNA RAPP, TESTING WOMEN, TESTING THE FETUS: THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF AMNIOCENTESIS IN 
AMERICA (1999) (discussing the stratification of reproduction in the context of prenatal testing); Shellee 
Colen, “Like a Mother to Them”: Stratified Reproduction and West Indian Childcare Workers and Employers 
in New York, in CONCEIVING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 78, 78 (Faye D. Ginsburg & Rayna Rapp eds., 1995) 
(arguing that “physical and social reproductive tasks are accomplished differentially according to inequalities 
that are based on hierarchies of class, race, ethnicity, gender, place in a global economy, and migration status 
and that are structured by social, economic, and political forces”). 
 2 See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, 
and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991); Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New 
Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935 (1996). 
 3 See generally, e.g., Bid to Sterilize Drug Addicts Is Opposed by Calif. Activists, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 
1999, at A15; Suzanne Herel, Woman Who Pays Addicts Not to Conceive Is Welcomed, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 1, 
2001, at A13; Lynn Paltrow, Nat’l Advocates for Pregnant Women, Treatment, Not Sterilization, Is the Way to 
Help Addicted Moms (2000), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/articles/oped.htm. 
 4 See, e.g., Gamal I. Serour, Dir., Int’l Islamic Ctr. for Population Studies and Res., Al-Azhar Univ., 
Egypt, Ethical Guidelines for Gender Selection: Are They Needed?, Address at the University of Michigan’s 
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laws aim to deter women receiving public assistance from having even one 
additional healthy baby,5 largely unregulated fertility clinics regularly implant 
privileged women with multiple embryos, knowing the high risk multiple 
births pose for premature delivery and low birth weight.6  The public 
begrudges poor mothers a meager increase in benefits for one more child, but 
celebrates the birth of high-tech septuplets that require a fortune in publicly-
supported hospital care.7 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the race and class dimensions 
of reproduction, a chief way of creating families, are clear.  My prior writing 
on the stratification of reproduction contrasted policies that penalize the 
childbearing of poor nonwhite women with policies that promote childbearing 
by wealthier white women.8  I take a different tack in this article.  Rather than 
place these two categories of women in opposition, I explore how the 
privatization and punishment of reproduction links them together to avoid 
public responsibility for social inequities.  Both population control programs 
and genetic selection technologies reinforce biological explanations for social 
problems and place reproductive duties on women that shift responsibility for 
improving social conditions away from the state. Reproductive health policies 
involving both categories of women play an important role in the neo-liberal 
state’s transfer of services from the welfare state to the private realm of family 
and market. 
 
Institute of Research on Women and Gender International Conference: Reproductive Disruptions: 
Childlessness, Adoption, and Other Reproductive Complexities (May 19–22, 2005), available at www.umich. 
edu/~reprocon/Serour Absrtract.doc; Johns Hopkins University Genetics and Public Policy Center Conference, 
Custom Kids: The Genetic Testing of Embryos (Jan. 8, 2004) (meeting summary available at GENETICS & 
PUB. POL’Y CTR., GENETIC TESTING OF HUMAN EMBRYOS PROVOKES LIVELY DISCUSSION, http://www.dnapoli 
cy.org/tools-content/pdfs/2/62712.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2005)). 
 5 Gwendolyn Mink, Violating Women: Rights Abuses in the Welfare Police State, 577 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 79, 85–86 (2001). 
 6 Frans M. Helmerhorst et al., Perinatal Outcome of Singletons and Twins after Assisted Conception: A 
Systematic Review of Controlled Studies, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 261, 262–63 (2004), available at 
http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/reprint/328/7434/261; John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to 
Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 9 (2004). 
 7 See LORI B. ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE: ADVENTURES IN THE NEW WORLD OF REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY 55 (1999) (noting that the McCaughey septuplets “required forty health care professionals, 
divided into seven teams, at an estimated cost of up to $1 million”); id. at 61 (noting that the McCaugheys 
received numerous expensive gifts, including a six thousand square foot house built with private donations, a 
Toyota minivan, and a lifetime supply of Pampers); Tucker McQueen, Party of Five: Parents of Quintuplets 
Give Support, Friendship to Couple about to Experience Similar Difficulties—and Joys, ATLANTA J.-CONST., 
Nov. 1, 2004, at 1E. 
 8 See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF 
LIBERTY (1997). 
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Viewing new reproductive technologies as a form of private regulation of 
women’s childbearing decisions complicates the choice-versus-regulation 
dichotomy that typically frames discussions of these technologies’ costs and 
benefits.  Technologies that enable women to have children and to select those 
children’s genetic traits are often viewed as entirely freedom-enhancing tools 
that should therefore be free from state regulation.  I argue, however, that like 
the reproductive regulations imposed on less privileged women, use of these 
technologies has the potential to restrict women’s control over reproduction 
while reinforcing social hierarchies that disadvantage women.  Thus, it is 
possible that some state regulation of the technologies will promote rather than 
hamper women’s reproductive freedom.  More importantly, recognizing the 
restrictive potential of reprogenetics supports greater state investment in 
eliminating the systemic inequities that make these technologies seem so 
attractive for addressing disability and illness.  Rather than expand public 
surveillance and regulation of women’s reproductive decisions, we should 
tackle the social conditions that limit women’s options for bearing and raising 
healthy children who can flourish in this society. 
A. Punishing Reproduction, Privatization, and Social Inequality 
The turn of the twenty-first century has ushered in an explosion of rhetoric 
and policies seeking to punish and regulate poor and minority women’s 
reproductive decisions.  Poor black women are especially vulnerable to 
proposals that punish childbearing.  The view of black women as irresponsible 
reproducers is deeply embedded in the dominant American culture and 
reinforced by a disparaging mythology about black mothers.9  Negative icons 
of black maternity have included the sexually licentious Jezebel that 
legitimated white slave masters’ sexual exploitation of their female slaves; the 
asexual Mammy who, although she cared for her masters’ children, remained 
under the supervision of her white mistress; the emasculating Matriarch held 
responsible for the disintegration of the black family; and the sexually 
irresponsible Welfare Queen who bred children just to fatten her welfare check 
and then wasted the money recklessly on herself.10 
 
 9 See PATRICIA MORTON, DISFIGURED IMAGES: THE HISTORICAL ASSAULT ON AFRO-AMERICAN WOMEN 
1–13, 125–33 (1991); ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 10–21. 
 10 See generally, e.g., PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, 
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT (2000) (discussing negative stereotypes about black 
mothers); DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR’N’T I A WOMAN: FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH (1999) 
(describing the Jezebel and Mammy figures as chief representations of black enslaved women). 
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The most recent addition to this maternal mythology is the pregnant crack 
addict who is supposed to lack any maternal instinct.  Newspaper articles portray 
pregnant black women addicted to crack cocaine as careless and selfish women 
who put their love for crack above their concern for their children.11  Reinforcing 
the link between black female sexual licentiousness and maternal 
irresponsibility, reporters often represent them as prostitutes who become 
pregnant after trading sex for crack.12  Unlike any other drug, the chemical 
properties of crack cocaine are said to destroy the natural impulse to mother.13  
These women’s children are also the subject of gross racial stereotyping.  Some 
reporters claim that so-called “crack babies” not only suffer physical and 
emotional damage, but are also more likely to become social pariahs.14  Noting 
the failure of medical research to substantiate any such condition, syndrome, or 
disorder, a group of researchers wrote that “‘Crack baby’ is not a medical 
diagnosis but a media stereotype.”15 
These stereotypes of black female sexual and reproductive irresponsibility 
support welfare reform and law enforcement policies that severely regulate poor 
black women’s sexual and child bearing decisions.16  Judges and legislators view 
poor black women as suitable subjects for harsh reproductive penalties because 
mainstream society does not view them as suitable mothers in the first place.17 
The rush to punish poor, substance-abusing mothers for their reproductive 
failures can be compared with the more temperate regulation of pregnant middle-
class women who use risky pharmaceuticals to treat their mental health 
problems.  For example, I was struck by the sympathy shown to mothers in a 
recent radio program  discussing the dilemma of pregnant women who take 
Prozac and other SSRIs (Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors), which have 
not been approved by the FDA for use during pregnancy because there is 
 
 11 See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 153–59 (citing articles); ASSATA ZERAI & RAE BANKS, 
DEHUMANIZING DISCOURSE, ANTI-DRUG LAW, AND POLICY IN AMERICA: A CRACK MOTHER’S NIGHTMARE 53 
(2002). 
 12 ZERAI & BANKS, supra note 11, at 53. 
 13 See, e.g., Cathy Trost, Born to Lose: Babies of Crack Users Crowd Hospitals, Break Everybody’s 
Heart, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1989, at A1 (quoting a nurse as stating that “most remarkable and hideous aspect 
of crack cocaine use seems to be the undermining of the maternal instinct”); see also ZERAI & BANKS, supra 
note 11, at 50–57 (discussing newspaper articles that supported a “crusade against crack mothers” from 1988 
to 1990). 
 14 See, e.g., Rich Connell, The Hidden Devastation of Crack, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, at A1. 
 15 Deborah A. Frank et al., Letter to the Editor, “Crack Baby” Syndrome, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2003, at 
A42. 
 16 See ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 159–62; ZERAI & BANKS, supra note 11, at 142–43. 
 17 See ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 159–67. 
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evidence they may cause subtle neurological problems in newborns.18  A 
psychiatrist interviewed for the program explained that she tries to put the FDA 
warning in context: “Ultimately, when you are face-to-face with a woman 
struggling with depression or anxiety during or after her pregnancy, her 
experience of illness is, I think, the most important determinant of the right thing 
to do.”19  This attention to the depressed mother’s perspective contrasts starkly 
with the typical disregard of the needs and humanity of poor black women who 
self-medicate with crack cocaine. 
By identifying procreation as the cause of deplorable social conditions, 
reproductive punishments divert attention away from the need for social 
change.  Black mothers’ crack use, for example, became a primary explanation 
for high rates of black infant mortality, a trend long predating the crack 
epidemic.20  A recent exchange in the editorial pages of the New York Times 
iterated the tension between attributing worsening rates of infant death to the 
deficiencies of the U.S. health care system and to maternal substance abuse.  
Columnist Nicholas D. Kristof wrote that in 2002 the already abysmal infant 
mortality rate rose in this country to seven deaths for each thousand live births, 
placing the United States behind forty-one other countries, including Cuba.21  
Kristof noted that by slashing entitlements, especially those giving children 
access to health care, the government is likely to exacerbate poor maternal and 
infant health.22 
In direct response to Kristof’s article, Barry S. Levy, an adjunct professor 
at Tufts Medical School and a past president of the American Public Health 
Association, endorsed Kristof’s diagnosis: “America’s world ranking of 42nd 
in infant mortality, like the obesity and smoking epidemics and the recent 
shortage of flu vaccine, reflects the overall decline in government support for 
public health.”23  But Betsy McCaughey, an adjunct senior fellow at the 
Hudson Institute, disagreed with Kristof’s focus on “the shortcomings of our 
health system,” arguing instead that “the high infant mortality rate reflects a 
 
 18 Suffering for Two: The Bind of Maternal Depression (American Radioworks radio broadcast Aug. 
2004), available at http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/maternaldepression/transcript.html. 
 19 Id. 
 20 See ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 154–59. 
 21 Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Health Care? Ask Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2005, at A21. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Barry S. Levy, Letter to the Editor, Why are Infants at Risk in America?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at 
A22. 
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society where young girls and women take drugs while pregnant and give birth 
to low-weight, drug addicted infants.”24 
Neither Kristof nor his respondents mentioned the contribution of 
reproduction-assisting technologies to the rising rate of infant deaths.  The 
numbers of babies born with low birth weight has increased in recent years in 
part because of high risk multiple births to women who implant several 
embryos created with high-tech procedures.25  Affluent women who decide to 
take the risk of bearing unhealthy babies have not suffered the official 
sanctions or public vilification directed to poor women with substance abuse 
problems who often take steps to minimize any harm to their babies.26 
This diversion of attention from social causes and solutions reinforces 
privatization, the hallmark of the neo-liberal state that pervades every aspect of 
public policy.  In the wake of globalization, industrialized and developing 
states have sought to reduce the financial burden of social welfare programs 
while promoting the free market conditions conducive to capital 
accumulation.27  Observing this phenomenon, Canadian legal scholar Roxanne 
Mykitiuk writes that “the public sphere embraces as its governing logic market 
rationales and practices.”28  Critical to this process of state restructuring is the 
 
 24 Betsy McCaughey, Letter to the Editor, Why are Infants at Risk in America?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 
2005, at A22. 
 25 See Marian F. MacDorman et al., Explaining the 2001–2002 Infant Mortality Increase: Data from the 
Linked Birth/Infant Death Data Set, 53 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 5 (2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr53/nvsr53_12.pdf (“Increases in the number and percentage of multiple births over the past 
two decades have contributed to increases in the percentage of preterm and low birthweight births,” and 
account for twenty-five percent of the increase in infant mortality between 2001 and 2002); see also Seth 
Borenstein, U.S. Infant Mortality Rate Increases: Cause Attributed to Older Mothers Giving Birth, Multiple 
Births, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 12, 2004, at 10A; Rob Stein, U.S. Infant Mortality Rate Rises 3%: First 
Increase Since ‘58 Surprises Officials as Other Health Indicators Keep Improving, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 
2004, at A11. 
 26 See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 191–92 (discussing Jennifer Johnson’s efforts to get treatment for 
her crack cocaine addiction while pregnant); see also Margaret H. Kearney et al., Mothering on Crack 
Cocaine: A Grounded Theory Analysis, 38 SOC. SCI. & MED. 351, 355 (1994) (describing “defensive 
compensation” by substance abusing mothers to protect their children from the negative effects of the mothers’ 
drug use).  My point is not to judge the culpability of either group of women, but to highlight and contest the 
disparities in societal and state judgments about their reproductive decisions. 
 27 See generally DAG MACLEOD, DOWNSIZING THE STATE: PRIVATIZATION AND THE LIMITS OF 
NEOLIBERAL REFORM IN MEXICO (2004); Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as 
Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399 (2001); 
Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare 
State, 78 IND. L.J. 783 (2003). 
 28 Roxanne Mykitiuk, The New Genetics in the Post-Keynesian State, in THE WORKING GROUP ON 
WOMEN, HEALTH AND THE NEW GENETICS, THE GENDER OF GENETIC FUTURES 106, 107 (Fiona Miller et al. 
eds., 2000), http://www.cwhn.cn/groups/biotech/availdocs/full-doc-2.pdf. 
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transfer of services from the welfare state to the private realm of the market 
and family.29  At the same time, the state deliberately transforms its institutions 
to advance private sector interests in the market economy. 
In his second term, President George W. Bush’s domestic agenda explicitly 
revolved around promoting these neo-liberal values.  He called for 
privatization of programs traditionally provided by government as the means 
of establishing an “ownership society” in the United States that would replace 
the prevailing New Deal approach.30  The Cato Institute, a libertarian think 
tank that champions the ownership society, describes the concept as follows: 
An ownership society values responsibility, liberty and property. 
Individuals are empowered by freeing them from dependence on 
government handouts and making them owners instead, in control of 
their own lives and destinies. In the ownership society, patients 
control their own health care, parents control their own children’s 
education, and workers control their retirement savings.31 
President Bush’s most controversial step in creating an ownership society is 
the restructuring of Social Security to allow younger workers to divert a 
portion of their social security taxes into private accounts that could be 
invested in stocks and bonds.32  President Bush’s plans for an ownership 
society also include eliminating tax laws that penalize wealth accumulation 
and transfer, and changing class action laws to shield corporations from large 
tort damages awards.33  The ownership society and the privatization 
philosophy it reflects demand that individuals rely on their own wealth to meet 
their needs and discourage government aid for poor mothers who face systemic 
hardships in caring for their children. 
At the same time that the government has reduced support for families, 
there has been a parallel increase in state intervention in poor women’s lives.  
 
 29 Id. 
 30 Jill Lawrence, Some Ask Who Belongs in ‘Ownership Society,’ USA TODAY, Mar. 22, 2005, at 4A; 
Eduardo Porter, When It Comes to Managing Retirement, Many People Simply Can’t, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 
2005, at C3. 
 31 David Boaz, Cato Inst., Defining an Ownership Society (2003), http://www.cato.org/special/owner 
ship_society/boaz.html; see Adam Werbach, A Dangerous Legacy: Bush’s “Ownership Society” Champions a 
Hyper-Individualism that Threatens the Commons, IN THESE TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at 37, available at 
www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/1408. 
 32 See Judy Keen, Bush’s Choice of Words Is Telling, USA TODAY, Mar. 11, 2005, at 6A. 
 33 See, e.g., Janet Hook, Off to a Running Start, How Far Can GOP Go?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at 
A1; James Hoopes, Don’t Draw Line at Dividends, End Wage Tax Too, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 23, 2003, at F4 
(discussing double taxing of dividends). 
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Over the last two decades, the welfare system, prison system, and foster care 
system have clamped down on poor minority communities, especially inner-
city black neighborhoods, thereby increasing many families’ experience of 
insecurity and surveillance.34  Welfare is no longer a system of aid, but rather a 
system of behavior modification that attempts to regulate the sexual, marital, 
and childbearing decisions of poor unmarried mothers by placing conditions on 
the receipt of state assistance.  The federal government encourages states to 
implement financial incentives that deter welfare recipients from having 
children and pressure them to get married.35 
The contraction of the U.S. welfare state, culminating in the 1996 federal 
welfare reform legislation,36 paralleled the expansion of prisons that 
stigmatizes inner-city communities and isolates them further from the 
privileges of mainstream society.  Radical changes in crime control and 
sentencing policies led to an unprecedented buildup of the U.S. prison 
population over the last thirty years.  By the end of 2002, the number of 
inmates in the nation’s jails and prisons exceeded two million.37  Today’s 
imprisonment rate is five times as high as in 1972 and surpasses that of all 
other nations.38  The sheer scale and acceleration of U.S. prison growth has no 
parallel in western societies.39  African Americans experience a uniquely 
astronomical rate of imprisonment, and the social effects of imprisonment are 
concentrated in their communities.40 
Mounting social science studies on the community-level impact of mass 
incarceration reveal that prison has become a systemic aspect of community 
members’ family affairs, economic prospects, political engagement, social 
 
 34 See infra notes 36–49 and accompanying text. 
 35 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 601 
(2000); PAULA ROBERTS, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POL’Y, A BRIEF COMPARISON OF THE MARRIAGE-RELATED 
PROVISIONS IN WELFARE REAUTHORIZATION BILLS PASSED BY THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE AND THE 
HOUSE HUMAN RESOURCES SUBCOMMITTEE (2005), http://www.clasp.org/publications/sbs_marriage_060805. 
pdf; Mink, supra note 5; Legal Momentum, Welfare and Poverty: State Marriage Initiatives, http://www.legal 
momentum.org/issues/wel/marriagefamily.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2005). 
 36 See 42 U.S.C. § 601. 
 37 Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Prison Population Rises 2.6 
Percent During 2002 (July 27, 2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/p02pr.htm (“The country’s 
prisons, jails and juvenile facilities held 2,166,260 persons at the end of last year . . . .”). 
 38 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES: GROWTH IN POPULATION CONTINUES 1 
(2005), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1044.pdf; David Garland, Introduction: The 
Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1, 1 (David 
Garland ed., 2001). 
 39 Garland, supra note 38, at 1. 
 40 See id. at 1–2 (describing the defining features of mass imprisonment). 
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norms, and childhood expectations for the future.41  This social dynamic 
aggravates and augments the negative consequences to individual inmates 
when they come from and return to particular neighborhoods in concentrated 
numbers.  Prisons break down social networks and norms needed for political 
solidarity and activism.42  Mass incarceration also destroys social citizenship at 
the community level through felon disenfranchisement laws that dilute 
neighborhood voting strength, through labor market exclusion, and by marking 
entire communities as criminal and undeserving of public resources.43 
The racial disparity in the child welfare system mirrors that of the prison 
system.44  Because child welfare policy relies heavily on the punitive removal 
of children from their homes, the largest group of the children awaiting 
adoption in the nation’s public child welfare agencies is African-American.45 
One year after Congress passed the welfare reform law, it enacted the 
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA).46  ASFA amended federal 
child welfare policy by prioritizing protection of children over the support of 
families and by promoting adoption as a means to fix the overloaded foster 
care system.47  As Mark Courtney notes, this marks the first time in U.S. 
history that states have a federal mandate to protect children from abuse and 
neglect but no corresponding mandate to provide basic economic support to 
poor families.48  Like welfare reform, ASFA looks to a private remedy—in this 
case, adoption—rather than curtailing the flow of poor, minority children into 
foster care by providing needed resources to their families. Not only is there no 
guarantee that all the children awaiting adoption will be placed in adoptive 
homes, but adoption does nothing to address the needs of poor families who 
are most at risk of involvement in the child welfare system.49 
 
 41 See generally Jeffrey Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City 
Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1551 (2003) (discussing various studies). 
 42 Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American 
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1281–1304 (2004). 
 43 Id. at 1281–97. 
 44 See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 206 (2002). 
 45 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS (ADOPTION AND 
FOSTER CARE ANALYSIS AND REPORTING SYSTEM) REPORT: INTERIM FY 2000 ESTIMATES AS OF AUGUST 2002 
(7), at 2–3, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/afcars/report7.pdf. 
 46 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 47 ROBERTS, supra note 44, at 173. 
 48 Mark E. Courtney, The Costs of Child Protection in the Context of Welfare Reform, 8 FUTURE 
CHILDREN 88, 101 (1998). 
 49 ROBERTS, supra note 44, at 149–72. 
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At times, policy regimes have emphasized the social causes of marginality 
and attempted to use welfare and prisons to reform and integrate socially 
dispossessed groups.50  Exclusionary regimes, such as the one we are 
witnessing in the United States today, paint marginalized people as 
undeserving and unreformable deviants to be separated from the rest of 
society; this is reflected in stingy public assistance and punitive anticrime 
policies.51 
There is a correlation between punishment and privatization.  The decrease 
in state responsibility for addressing poverty and social inequality has 
accompanied an increase in state intervention in the lives of poor- and low-
income mothers, especially women of color.  In other words, economic 
insecurity is increasing among the most disadvantaged communities not only 
because of state inaction, but also because of policies that affirmatively sustain, 
replicate, and intensify systemic political and economic subordination.  And 
these two trends are mutually reinforcing. 
Private remedies for systemic inequality and punitive state regulation of the 
most disadvantaged  communities are two sides of the same coin.  Deliberate 
state policies and practices work affirmatively to increase economic insecurity 
of these communities while obscuring the state’s responsibility for causing it or 
government’s obligation to address it.  Attributing social inequities to the 
childbearing of poor minority women and then using this attribution to justify 
the regulation of reproduction is a critical component of this punitive trend 
away from state support for families and communities. 
B. Reproductive Genetics, Privatization, and Social Inequality 
At the other end of reproductive caste system, new genetic technologies 
have generated greater surveillance of women, the ones primarily responsible 
for making the “right” genetic decisions.  For decades, prenatal testing has 
provided the capacity to avoid bearing children with genetic disorders.  
Advances in reproduction-assisting technologies that create embryos in a 
 
 50 Katherine Beckett & Bruce Western, Governing Social Marginality: Welfare, Incarceration, and the 
Transformation of State Policy, in MASS IMPRISONMENT, supra note 38, at 35, 35–36; see, e.g., DAVID 
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 51 See Beckett & Western, supra note 50, at 36.  See generally Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathon Simon, 
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laboratory have converged with advances in genetic testing to produce 
increasingly sophisticated methods to select for preferred genetic traits.  
Reproductive technologies like in vitro fertilization assist couples to have 
children who not only are genetically related to them but who are genetically 
advantaged.  With preimplantation genetic diagnosis clinicians can diagnose 
early embryos for their chance of having over four hundred genetic conditions 
and implant only the ones that probably do not have these conditions.  Sperm 
sorting allows couples to select the sex of their children with eighty-five 
percent accuracy.52  Some scientists predict that reproductive cloning and 
genetic engineering—actually enhancing the embryo’s genetic makeup—will 
be developed in the near future.53  These cutting edge procedures that enable 
selection of embryos for their genetic traits are part of a new kind of 
reproduction-assisting science called “reprogenetics.”54 
It is important to distinguish between the ways in which genetic testing is 
actually implemented.  On the one hand, mass carrier screening programs, 
especially those mandated by the government and aimed at reducing the 
incidence of a disease in a population, have led to widespread discrimination 
and coercion.55  On the other hand, providing nondirective genetic counseling 
with informed consent to individuals who request it is unlikely to exploit 
women and members of minority groups.  Yet genetic screening programs, 
even if they are supposed to be voluntary, create the expectation that women 
will act on the results.  Communities can put pressure on parents, especially 
mothers, to produce perfect babies for the sake of the whole. 
Ashkenazi Jews in the United States have developed perhaps the most 
sophisticated defense and successful implementation of a community-based 
program of genetic screening, largely responsible for a ninety percent 
reduction in the incidence of Tay-Sachs disease from 1970 to 1993.56  An 
authority on Jewish medical ethics defends the program as a “legitimate 
 
 52 Erik Parens & Lori P. Knowles, Reprogenetics and Public Policy: Reflections and Recommendations, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jul.–Aug. 2003, at S4 (special supp.). 
 53 ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 237–39; GREGORY STOCK, REDESIGNING HUMANS: OUR INEVITABLE 
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 54 Parens & Knowles, supra note 52, at S4. The authors define reprogenetics, broadly, as “the field of 
research and application that involves the creation, use, manipulation, or storage of gametes or embryos.”  Id. 
 55 See generally TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS (1990). 
 56 See generally Michael Kaback et al., Tay-Sachs Disease: Carrier Screening, Prenatal Diagnosis, and 
the Molecular Era: An International Perspective 1970–1993, 270 JAMA 2307 (1993); Christine Rosen, 
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implementation of the biblical mandate to heal.”57  Premarital genetic testing 
for Tay-Sachs has become the standard of care in some Orthodox Jewish 
communities where marriages are arranged.58  “It’s now a duty, not a choice,” 
says legal scholar Karen Rothenberg.59 
More generally, it is increasingly routine for pregnant woman to get 
prenatal diagnoses for certain genetic conditions such as Down syndrome or 
dwarfism.60  Many obstetricians provide these tests without much explanation 
or deliberation because they consider these screenings to be a normal part of 
treating their pregnant patients.  The director of reproductive genetics at a large 
Detroit hospital reported that at least half of the women referred there with an 
abnormal amniocentesis result were “uncertain about why they even had the 
test.”61  A genetic counselor similarly notes, “Patients will come in and say, ‘I 
am having the amniocentesis because my doctor told me to,’ but really in their 
hearts they are not so sure that’s right for them.  Some people are relieved to 
find that they have a choice about having the test.”62  Still, many pregnant 
women now view genetic testing as a requirement of responsible mothering. 
I experienced this type of shallow ethical evaluation of prenatal testing in 
2000 when I was pregnant with my fourth child at age forty-four.  My 
obstetrician recommended that I participate in a clinical trial by Northwestern 
University Medical School researchers investigating the potential for 
ultrasound to help detect genetic anomalies in the first trimester of 
pregnancy.63  “It’s a way to get a free ultrasound,” he told me.  Although the 
researchers had an ethical obligation to reveal any significant risks entailed in 
the procedure, neither they nor my obstetrician discussed with me the decision 
I would have to make if the test results predicted that the fetus I was carrying 
had a high risk of Down syndrome.64  Instead, everyone seemed to assume that 
 
 57 Rosen, supra note 56, at 81. 
 58 Charles M. Strom, Population-Based Carrier Screening and Prenatal Diagnosis, 36 MED. LIBR. 
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 59 Rosen, supra note 56, at 87.  See generally WOMEN AND PRENATAL TESTING: FACING THE 
CHALLENGES OF GENETIC TECHNOLOGY (Karen H. Rothenberg & Elizabeth Jean Thompson eds., 1994). 
 60 See Carol Smith, Q-and-A on Genetic Testing, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 2, 2004, at B3. 
 61 The Telltale Gene, 55 CONSUMER REP. 483, 486 (1990). 
 62 LYNDA BECK FENWICK, PRIVATE CHOICES, PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
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 63 See generally Ronald Wapner et al., First-Trimester Screening for Trisomies 21 and 18, 349 NEW 
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the information could only make me better off and that there was no need for 
serious deliberation about what I would do with it.65 
Like the punishment of minority women’s childbearing, reprogenetics is 
linked to the elimination of the welfare state and support for private remedies 
for illness and disease.  Placing responsibility for ending health disparities on 
individual reproductive decisions can reduce the sense of societal obligation to 
address systemic inequities.  Reliance on eradicating illness through genetics 
can divert attention and resources away from the social causes of disability and 
disease, as well as social norms that impair social participation by sick and 
disabled people.  Some disability rights activists argue that genetic testing may 
privatize disability in the sense that availability of prenatal diagnosis for a 
disorder may discourage government funding for research and social services 
for people who have the disorder.66 
Genetic biotechnologies also shift responsibility for addressing disease 
from the government to the individual by suggesting that health disparities are 
a result of genetic variation rather than inequitable social structures and access 
to health care.  The FDA recently approved BiDil, the first race-based drug, to 
treat heart failure specifically in African Americans.67  One theory supporting 
BiDil is that the reason for higher mortality rates among black heart patients 
lies in genetic differences among the races, either in the reason for getting 
heart disease or the reason for responding differently to various medications 
for it.68  BiDil’s manufacturer discounts the importance of environmental 
factors in explaining differences in black and white patients’ experience of 
heart disease to market a technological cure based on an asserted genetic 
difference.69  As law professor Jonathan Kahn has chronicled, the FDA’s initial 
denial of approval to BiDil as a race-less drug led its creators to re-
conceptualize it as a drug for blacks, enabling them not only to obtain the 
 
 65 The Genetics and Public Policy Center at Johns Hopkins University recommends considerably greater 
deliberation prior to prenatal genetic testing: “The decision to undergo prenatal diagnostic testing should be 
carefully considered. The testing should usually be done in concert with a process of education and values 
clarification.” GENETICS & PUB. POL’Y CTR., PRENATAL GENETIC TESTING 5 (2003), available at http://tools-
content.labvelocity.com/pdfs/3/62763.pdf. 
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FDA’s blessing, but also raise venture capital, receive a lucrative patent, and 
launch a successful marketing campaign.70 
At the same time, the neo-liberal support for capital accumulation 
increasingly pervades the biotechnology industry.  The initiative approved by 
California voters in November 2004, allocating $3 billion in tax-supported 
bonds to the biotechnology industry for stem cell research, illustrates the 
state’s promotion of private investment in genetic technologies.71  The state-
supported biotechnology industry creates a market for its genetic testing and 
selection products by making consumers feel obligated to use them to ensure 
the genetic fitness of their children.72 
Reprogenetics serves as a form of privatization that makes the individual 
the site of governance through the self-regulation of genetic risk.73  As 
Professor Mykitiuk writes, “Is there a sense in which the new genetic 
technologies are being used, or are capable of being used, as a means of 
literally creating the responsible, autonomous, citizen of neo-liberalism—that 
citizen who makes no legitimate claims on the state but rather, who freely 
exercises their capacity for choice and manages their own self care?”74  The 
logic of reprogenetics could support the view that childhood illness and 
disability is the fault of mothers for not making the right genetic choices.  
Making the wrong genetic choices in turn disqualifies citizens from claiming 
public support.  These women are, in effect, punished for their reproductive 
decision to have an ill or disabled child because they are denied the support 
they need to raise their child.  In her book exploring the public consequences 
of private decisions about reproductive technologies, Lynda Beck Fenwick 
asks readers to ask themselves, “Are you willing to pay higher taxes to cover 
costs of government benefits for babies born with genetic defects, even when 
the parents knew of the high likelihood or certainty such defects would 
occur?”75  As a result, the proliferation and promotion of new genetic 
technologies is inversely related to access to general health care. 
Women bear the brunt of reprogenetics’ contribution to the neo-liberal 
restructuring of health care.  Genetic technology introduces a new gendered 
 
 70 Id. at 46. 
 71 See CAL. CONST. art. XXXV; CAL. PROP. 71, STEM CELL RESEARCH. FUNDING BONDS. INITIATIVE 
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 72 See Mykitiuk, supra note 28, at 109–10. 
 73 Id. at 108. 
 74 Id. 
 75 FENWICK, supra note 62, at 113. 
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division of reproductive labor and surveillance as women become “gatekeepers 
of new social order.”76  Professor Mykitiuk points out that, contrary to the 
deregulation that typically occurs in the service of big business, the new duties 
imposed on women constitute a “re-regulation intended to make possible the 
greater appropriation of intellectual property and its capitalization.”77 
Reprogenetics also makes eugenic thinking seem more acceptable.  
Sociologist Barbara Katz Rothman calls the marketing of prenatal diagnostic 
technologies a form of “micro-eugenics,” eugenics focused on the individual 
(in contrast to macro-eugenics’ focus on populations), that values or disvalues 
specific characteristics believed to be inherited.78  Some disabilities rights 
advocates object to preimplantation or fetal diagnoses that lead to discarding 
embryos and fetuses predicted to have disabilities because they devalue people 
who have these disabilities, implying that they should never have been born.79  
The quality of many disabled people’s lives depends as much on social 
acceptance, access, and accommodation as on their physical capacities.  Apart 
from avoiding certain fatal or severely disabling diseases, such as anencephaly 
or Tay-Sachs disease, reprogenetics inscribes the perceived social advantage of 
having or not having certain abilities or traits associated with genes.  Selecting 
children’s abilities or sex reflects the social advantages and disadvantages 
connected to these categories and may reinforce an unjust value system that 
privileges some over others.  Unable to count on societal acceptance or support 
for children with disabilities, however, many women feel compelled to turn to 
genetic testing to ensure their children’s welfare.80 
The role privileged women play in this integrated system of privatization 
and punishment is obscured by liberal notions of reproductive choice.  Despite 
the potential for reprogenetics to diminish public health care and intensify 
regulation of women’s reproductive decisions, its sponsors often defend the 
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industry’s immunity from state regulation in the name of women’s 
reproductive freedom.  Marsha Tyson Darling of the Center for African-
American and Ethnic Studies at Adelphi University notes that “eugenic 
advocates have undertaken to infuse eugenics imperatives into the women’s 
reproductive rights movement.”81  They see women’s ability to select the traits 
of their children, including sex and other qualities unrelated to health, as an 
aspect of reproductive choice.  Concerns about the implications for women, the 
disabled, racial minorities, and other disadvantaged groups are dismissed as 
threats to reproductive freedom. 
As I argued above, however, creating duties to use reprogenetic 
technologies in prescribed ways would limit women’s choices.  Just as 
important, the promotion of these technologies in the context of systemic 
inequalities and inadequate support for caregiving steers women to make 
reproductive decisions that reinforce social inequality.  Thomas H. Murray 
faults procreative liberty as the ethical framework for evaluating reproductive 
technology for its “difficulty summoning the ethical will to curb the indulgence 
of almost any parental whim.”82  One important ethical curb, on public policy 
as well as parental decisions, that is elided by the singular focus on 
reproductive choice is the social harm risked by eugenic thinking. 
Indeed, some clients of reprogenetics have even claimed moral superiority 
over women who have abortions for nonselective reasons.  In a July 22, 2004, 
op-ed piece in the New York Times, Barbara Ehrenreich called on women who 
aborted fetuses based on prenatal diagnosis to support the general right to 
abortion.83  She noted that these women sometimes distinguish themselves 
from women who have “ordinary” abortions.  One woman who aborted a fetus 
with Down syndrome stated, “I don’t look at it as though I had an abortion, 
even though that is technically what it is.  There’s a difference.  I wanted this 
baby.”84  On a website for a support group called “A Heart Breaking Choice” a 
mother who went to an abortion clinic complains, “I resented the fact that I had 
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to be there with all these girls that did not want their babies.”85  This perverse 
moral distinction between ordinary and so-called “medical abortion” reinforces 
the reproductive stratification that separates women whose childbearing is 
punished from those whose childbearing is technologically promoted by 
distinguishing even between the kinds of abortions they have. 
This classification of abortions is reminiscent of the historical distinction 
that states made between therapeutic or eugenic abortion and elective abortion.  
When abortion was criminalized in the United States during the second half of 
the nineteenth century, state laws made exceptions for cases in which 
pregnancy or childbirth threatened a woman’s life or health.86  While abortions 
based on women’s own decision not to have a child (“elective” abortions) were 
illegal, abortions based on physicians’ judgments about the medical or social 
ills of pregnancy (“therapeutic” or “eugenic” abortions) were approved.  
Physicians’ proposals for legislative reform prior to Roe v. Wade centered on 
the need for abortion to reduce either births of defective babies or births to 
women with psychiatric disorders.87  As historian Johanna Schoen observes, 
“the debates surrounding abortion focused on specific medical conditions that 
might justify a therapeutic or eugenic abortion but remained hostile to elective 
abortion, which could extend reproductive control to women.”88  The existence 
of a physical or mental impairment was more critical to the medical 
profession’s defense of abortion than enhancing women’s reproductive 
freedom. 
States classified abortions as eugenic, therapeutic, or elective as a means of 
regulating women’s access to them and limiting the potential of abortion to 
further women’s emancipation.  A contemporary woman who valorizes 
eugenic abortion while disparaging elective abortion resuscitates the nineteenth 
century abortion hierarchy, a hierarchy that impedes women’s reproductive 
self-determination.  Barbara Katz Rothman distinguishes arguments for legal 
abortion based on “fetal defect” from feminist prochoice claims because they 
focus on the fetus and not on the woman.89  Because eugenic thinking can 
pressure women to abort a fetus deemed to be genetically inferior, Marsha 
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Saxton notes that the goal of the disability rights movement concerning 
abortion is “the right not to have to have an abortion.”90  The incorporation of 
eugenic values in arguments for women’s reproductive freedom neglects the 
history of abortion regulation as well as the potential for reprogenetics to 
impose restrictive expectations on women to serve as genetic screeners of 
children. 
CONCLUSION 
The women at opposite ends of the reproductive hierarchy are part of an 
interlocking system of privatization and punishment.  Both the punishment of 
marginalized women’s childbearing and the promotion of reprogenetics for 
privileged women place reproductive duties on women that help to privatize 
remedies for illness and social inequities.  Instead of joining together to contest 
the social forces that limit their reproductive freedom, including inadequate 
health care and the gendered division of household labor, these women are 
further separated by the exclusive genetic technology industry.  Affluent 
women’s access to high tech solutions to infertility, disability, and illness can 
impede their motivation to pursue collective action against social inequities, 
including their own subordinated position in relation to men.  The most 
privileged women’s increasing reliance on high-tech reproductive remedies for 
socially-caused problems thus obscures the role they share with the most 
disadvantaged women in the neo-liberal shift from social welfare to 
privatization and capital accumulation.  Both groups of women have an interest 
in halting this shift and in advocating for greater public investment in 
improving the social conditions that determine children’s welfare. 
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